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Introduction 
 
Hallucination is mostly treated as a mental state opposite to veridical 
perception. According to a common-sense view we usually think about 
hallucination as something different from illusion which is, in turn, any 
kind of perceptual error and misperceptions Our basic intuition is that: 
illusion is directed towards empirical object, though it somehow 
misrepresents it; while hallucination has no corresponding object it is 
about even though it seems to refer us to one. Consequently, here lies 
the true danger of having hallucinations — seeing things that are not 
really out there, which may lead to incorrect beliefs in hallucinated, 
actually non-existing object — delusions. Hallucinations are, then, not 
delusions, but they may provoke us to develop them (especially when 
hallucinations are persistent and obtrusive). 
The phenomenon of hallucination has entered the philosophical 
discourse as a case of illusive and deceptive perception. In this context 
hallucination is usually placed among various perceptual disturbances 
that are supposed to exhibit limitations and weaknesses of our senses, 
or even to prove that perceptually grounded beliefs cannot account for 
knowledge. Originally, then, cases of hallucination (along with instances 
of illusion) have served as examples in epistemological disputes about 
the validity of knowledge based on perceptual beliefs.  
Apart from this primary epistemological concern, the subject of 
hallucination is brought into play within ontological investigations of 
perception itself. Namely, the case of hallucination is used while 
addressing the matter of nature of perception (whether it has or lacks 
intentionality) and while determining the nature of object of perception. 
The possibility of hallucination is considered to be a challenge for 
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theories of perception, such as the direct (naïve) realism which assumes 
that perception is an immediate contact with the mind-independent 
objects and properties of the external world. It is also a tough nut to 
crack for contemporary externalism about experience which assumes 
the transparency of experience — the thesis stating that the content of 
experience is always something other than the experience itself 
(something ontologically independent from the experience)1. 
The purpose of this study is to work on the so-called argument 
from hallucination presented in the contemporary philosophical 
literature. The analysis of the argument will focus on elucidation and 
investigation of philosophical assumptions that are fundamental for the 
structure of this argument. Namely, I intend to raise following matters: 
(a) the semantic relationship between “hallucination” and “perception” 
which assumes the priority of the phenomenon of perception in 
discussions upon the phenomenon of hallucination; (b) the alleged 
qualitative indistinguishability of perception and hallucination; (c) the 
general conclusions about the nature of hallucination present in the 
argument from hallucination. The final part of the paper will be devoted 
to discussion upon the legitimacy of philosophical theses concerning the 
phenomenon of hallucination. 
 
Argument from hallucination as a thought-experiment 
 
The content of the argument from hallucination could be presented as 
follows2: 
 
1. Suppose that Joanna sees some red and round. But there is 
nothing red and round before her; there is no mind-independent 
                                                 
1 In this context the examples of hallucinatory experiences are used not only within 
the discussion about the nature of perception, but also within more general 
disputes concerning the structure of consciousness, the nature of its content (i.e., 
internalism-externalism debate), and the problem of qualia.  
2 Although there are many formulations of the argument from hallucination, I decided 
to rest upon the one taken from Harman (1990) and introduce some modifications 
within it (since Harman’s intention was rather to give an account of the general 
idea standing behind both the argument from hallucination and the argument from 
illusion). I have chosen Harman’s formulation, because it explicitly presents the 
argument in the form of thought-experiment. 
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object that would possess the qualities of redness and roundness. 
Thus, Joanna takes her experience to be a veridical perception, 
but in fact she undergoes the experience of hallucination. 
2. So, the red and round Joanna sees is not external to her. 
Therefore, it must be internal or/and mental. 
3. It is possible that hallucinatory experience can be qualitatively 
indistinguishable from veridical perception for a perceiver.  
4. In all cases of perception Joanna is directly aware of something 
mental and inner. Consequently, the conception of perceptual 
experience treating perception as intentional  relation between a 
perceiver and external, mind-independent objects cannot be 
correct. 
This presentation of an argument has a form of thought-experiment, as 
it involves a characterization of hypothetical situation, a merely possible 
scenario, rather than it refers to real cases of hallucinatory occurrences3. 
It is thought that carrying on the philosophical reflection in this manner 
frees philosophers from requirement of referring to the scientific data 
which are the empirical reports of actual instances of hallucinations. 
Thus, the variety and richness of hallucinatory experiences remains 
outside philosophical interest, since its purpose is to deal with the most 
extreme scenario as possible4. Presumably, this strategy enables the 
philosophical reflection to deal with the a priori statements concerning 
the general nature of perception and hallucination5. 
As Vega-Encabo (2010) correctly noticed, the argument from 
hallucination consists of two steps. The first step is concerned with the 
ontology of hallucination, and the second refers to the ontological 
consequences for perception derived from the hallucinatory case. More 
                                                 
3 The reconstruction of the argument from hallucination done by Robinson is 
traditionally considered to be the first and classical version of the argument (see 
Robinson 1994, 87f). 
4 That is, the situation where the perceiver mistakes a hallucinatory experience for a 
perception. 
5 Although thought-experiments are considered by and large an appropriate part of 
philosophical methodology, it remains a matter of controversy whether empirical 
findings should be included while constructing thought-experiments.  
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specifically, the first part of the argument (1–2) familiarizes us with the 
phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences, which are: 
having a phenomenal (sensual) character, being of non-relational kind, 
and being subjectively indiscriminable from veridical perception. The 
second part (3–4), in turn, involves a transition of consequences about 
hallucination to perceptual experience by assuming that states of 
hallucination belong to the category of perceptual states6. This transition 
is considered legitimate due to the possible phenomenological 
indistinguishability7 of hallucination and perception (3). The conclusion 
of the argument (4) states that perceptual experience reveals directly 
the content of our minds8, and only indirectly provides (if it does at all) 
contact with the mind-independent reality. 
 Moreover, the assumption that hallucinations can be subjectively 
indistinguishably from veridical perceptions (as Joanna takes her 
hallucinatory experience for a perceptual one) is the core of the 
argument. It is what de facto makes the argument valid and what posits 
the requirement upon every theory of perception to account for 
hallucinatory cases9.  
 
The ontological theses and consequences of the argument 
 
The phenomenological indistinguishability of hallucination and 
perception 
 
The argument from hallucinations takes certain philosophical 
                                                 
6 As a matter of fact, they are certain kind of non-veridical perceptual states.  
7 The terms “phenomenological” and “subjective” will be used interchangeably in the 
paper. They will refer to way how hallucinatory and perceptual experience are from 
the first-person perspective. 
8 This standpoint is, in fact, the central thesis of the proponents of indirect realism 
about perception, and internalist about mental content, or sense-data theory. 
Because of their mutual agreement on the conclusion of the argument from 
hallucination, Johnston (2004) proposes to give them a common name 
“conjunctivism”. 
9 In philosophical literature we may find many ways of dealing with the argument 
from hallucinations, such as the so-called adverbial theory and various versions 
disjunctivism. Since the detailed presentation of those proposals would be a 
departure from our main topic, for further reading see e.g., Crane (2005) and a 
compilation by Byrne and Logue (2009). 
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assumptions for granted. The most crucial one concerns the relation of 
hallucination and perception. Hallucinatory experience is a type of 
perceptual experience, but the one of non-veridical nature which, in 
addition, gives us an impression that when we are hallucinating we are 
actually perceiving. This relation between perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences is also clearly visible in the psychological and psychiatric 
literature. For instance, the American Psychiatric Association defines 
“hallucination” as: 
 
A sensory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of a true 
perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant 
sensory organ (1994, 767). 
 
This definition (and others as well10) stresses the semantic dependence 
of the concept of hallucination from the concept of perception. This 
semantic dependence means that the concept of hallucination is defined 
in reference to the concept of perception, and it is subsequently 
specified in terms of being opposite to true and veridical, or directly in 
terms of falsehood, mistake or deception. Thus, it is quite common to 
encounter understanding of hallucination as a “false sensory 
perception”11. 
Definitions of hallucination comprise also the assumption of 
phenomenological indistinguishability of hallucinatory and perceptual 
experience. This phenomenological feature was stressed by philosopher 
and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers (1963/1997) in his General 
Psychopathology, where he argued that from the subjective perspective 
hallucination resembles perception rather than imagery. By doing this 
comparison Jaspers listed features that, in his opinion, are shared both 
by perception and hallucination, and which imagery lacks. These 
common phenomenological features are: 
(a) the sensory character; 
(b) the apparent mind independence; 
(c) the impression of existence of the objects and properties 
presented; 
                                                 
10 For the extensive review of definitions see The Dictionary of Hallucinations by Blom 
(2010). 
11 For instance, see one of the older versions of Diagnostical and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, 398). 
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(d) the involuntariness of experience; 
(e) the sense of reality (Jaspers, 1963/1997, 69). 
 
Moreover, Jaspers stressed that these phenomenological characteristics 
are to be treated as the criteria of hallucinations. If certain experience 
lacks at least one them, the experience is to be considered as an instance 
of pseudohallucination12, and cannot be classified as a hallucination 
proper.  
Jaspers insisted that all the phenomenological criteria of genuine 
hallucination are the same as the phenomenological characteristics of 
veridical perception. In the words of contemporary language of 
analytical philosophy of mind, one could say that hallucination and 
perception are experiences sharing the same phenomenal character. In 
the argument from hallucination the commonality of phenomenological 
features (the sameness of phenomenal character) is, then, something 
what is assumed and taken as a ground for phenomenological 
indistinguishability. The identity of the phenomenological features of 
hallucination and perception is also the substantial reason for 
considering hallucinations as kind of perceptual experiences, and it is 
ipso facto a basis of the argument from hallucination. 
 
Hallucination as a perception with or without reference? 
 
A common philosophical view on perception (and on conscious 
experience in general) is that perceptual states are intentional. Despite 
the differences in the understandings of the notion of intentionality 
between the continental phenomenological movement and the analytical 
tradition, the idea that perceptual experience has a character of relation 
between subject and object is something both sides would accept.  
The essential difference between perception and hallucination is 
that the former has the empirical object of its intention while the latter is 
                                                 
12 This term was not invented by Jaspers, but taken from works of Russian physician 
Victor Kandinsky. Kandinsky used the notion of pseudohallucination in order to 
describe the phenomena lying between imagery and hallucination, which he 
allegedly were experiencing himself and did not consider as symptoms of 
psychopathology (Sanati 2012, Blom 2010). Nowadays, the concept has been a 
subject of criticism due to its ambiguity, and the terms such as hallucinatory-like 
experiences is preferred instead. 
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characterized by the absence of corresponding empirical object. The 
absence of empirical object is what defines hallucination and what begs 
a question whether hallucinatory experience is intentional. However, if 
perception is essentially intentional and hallucination is a kind of 
perception, then hallucination should also be considered as intentional. 
But, in the light of the understanding hallucination as an experience of 
perceptual character that differs itself from perception by lacking a 
perceived object, we must either assume that the intentionality of 
hallucination is of different kind from the intentionality of perception, or 
agree that perception is also not intentional.  
Moreover, the approval of the intentionality of hallucination is 
controversial for philosophers even if it does not affect the nature of 
perception13. It seems so, because by allowing for the intentionality of 
hallucinatory experience, one would be either committed to the 
possibility of non-existing objects, or forced to accept internal mental 
objects (and properties), or the concept of existence would be coerced 
into expanding so that “existence” would not merely mean “physical 
existence”.  
 
Philosophical assumptions of the argument from hallucination — a 
discussion 
 
Because of these undesirable consequences there are plenty of 
proposals rejecting the idea that hallucination is a kind of perception 
(e.g., Austin 1964, Byrne and Logue 2009)14. For instance, Austin (1964) 
stresses that by using expressions such as “false perception” we make a 
category mistake that relies upon employing the categories from the 
domain of judgement onto the domain of experience. Accordingly, 
perception (and any other sort of experience) is never false, though it 
may provoke false beliefs.  
                                                 
13 I refer here to the fact concerning the “true” reference of perceptual experience, 
which was originally to be proved by the argument from hallucination, that is the 
internal and/or mind-dependent objects. 
14 Interestingly, when we focus on the etymology of the term “hallucination”, we find 
little evidence of its alleged perceptual connotations, since the term comes from the 
Latin word halucinari (alucinari) meaning wandering mentally, day-dreaming, or 
being absent-minded. It also has roots in Greek verb aluein which means to wander, 
to be distraught, upset or outrageous (see Blom 2010, 219). 
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Within the phenomenological tradition similar idea was 
expressed by Merleau-Ponty who also insisted that “false perceptions are 
not genuine perceptions at all” (1962, 301). In addition, he stressed that 
when we approach the experience from its phenomenological aspect, 
categories of truthfulness or falsehood lose their relevance:  
 
If myths, dreams and illusion are to be possible, the apparent and the real 
must remain ambiguous in the subject as in the object. It has often been said 
that consciousness, by definition, admits of no separation of appearance and 
reality, and by this we are to understand that, in our knowledge of ourselves, 
appearance is reality: if I think I see or feel, I indubitably see or feel, whatever 
may be true of the external object. Here reality appears in its entirety, real 
being and appearance are one, and there is no reality other than the 
appearance. If this is true, there is no possibility that illusion and perception 
should have the same appearance, that my illusions should be perceptions 
with no object or my perceptions true hallucinations (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 
264). 
 
The idea that the phenomenological indistinguishability of 
perception and hallucination justifies treating hallucinations as 
perception is also controversial. The most apparent objection is that 
sharing the phenomenological features by two phenomena is not 
sufficient condition for assigning these phenomena to the same 
ontological category (Langsam 1997). In other words, the 
phenomenological claims cannot by themselves constitute the 
ontological claims.  
Moreover, not only perception and hallucination can be 
subjectively indistingushable. For instance, while dreaming we are also 
convinced of perceiving, the content of a dream presents itself 
independent of our will and with the overwhelming sense of reality, but 
still it seems unreasonable to treat dreams as having the same 
ontological nature as perceptions of waking consciousness. To consider a 
dream an experience of the same ontological kind as a perception would 
mean that we ignore the difference between altered state of 
consciousness and the ordinary state of consciousness, which obviously 
contradicts empirical findings15. Although the notion of altered state of 
consciousness is elusive, in scientific literature there is a moderate 
agreement of what kind of phenomena should be treated as forms of 
                                                 
15 See, for example, an article by Vaitl et al. (2005).   
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altered states of consciousness (Revonsuo, Kallio and Sikka 2009), and 
dream is definitely such a state16. On the other hand, Hobson (2001) 
gives empirical reasons why hallucination is a global state of a subject 
analogous to the state of dreaming. 
Developing this point further, we may ask why it sounds more 
legitimate to treat hallucination as a kind of perception rather than as a 
kind of altered state of consciousness itself17. As González (2010) points 
out, the argument from hallucination is based upon the fantastic view of 
hallucination which ignores the empirical reports concerning 
hallucinations and “usually presents the hallucinatory episodes as 
singular excerpts that are supposedly inserted and belong in a normal 
global experiential field, as if the rest of our mental life remained 
untouched and operating as usual”(205). Of course, the question — 
whether hallucination is a kind of altered state of consciousness or not 
— is still a matter of scientific dispute, but for that very reason it should 
also be raised within philosophical investigations. 
One final remark should be made in reference to the conclusion of 
the argument for the nature of object of hallucination. According to the 
argument, since properties (or objects) that perceiver hallucinates are 
not external properties of mind-independent physical world, they have to 
be somehow internal and mental properties. This conclusion reveals 
another controversial assumption of the argument from hallucination, 
namely the commitment to two oppositions. The one concerns the 
internal and the external, the another is about the mental and the 
physical. These concepts are mutually exclusive, as something may be 
either internal or external, and may be either mental or physical. 
Approaching the phenomenon of hallucination armed with those 
conceptual oppositions stands in contradiction with certain empirical 
data. As Larøi (2006) shows, research upon reported hallucinatory 
experiences indicates that hallucination does not necessarily have to 
appear phenomenologically as located in the outer world or be 
attributed to external object in order to be a hallucination. It happens, as 
well, that hallucinating subjects are not able to determine whether the 
                                                 
16 The review of various lists of altered states of consciousness can be found in Móró 
(2010). 
17 According to Windt (2011) and Kokoszka (2012) hallucinatory experiences are to 
be included within the domain of altered states of consciousness.  
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content of hallucination is “outside” or “inside”, but still consider their 
experiences as being hallucinatory. Larøi’s observation not only 
challenges the relevance of certain categories in defining hallucinatory 
phenomena, but it also provokes reflection to what extent our beliefs 
about nature of hallucinations are justified or they are just widely-held 
prejudices. 
 
Conclusions 
The prevailing philosophical discussion concerning hallucinatory 
experience is centred around the so-called argument from hallucination 
which is usually presented in the form of thought-experiment. 
Formulating the argument in this way allegedly enables philosophical 
analysis to face the possibility of such a hallucinatory experience which 
in principle cannot be subjectively distinct from veridical perception. 
Since the phenomenological features of hallucination proper (listed by 
Jaspers) are the ones shared by genuine perception, the 
phenomenological indistinguishability of these two phenomena seems to 
be a justified premise of the argument.  
Nevertheless, even if a perception and a hallucination had 
common phenomenological character, the transition from 
phenomenological description of phenomena to establishing ontological 
claims remains a subject of controversy. The impossibility of telling a 
hallucination from a veridical perception on the grounds of 
phenomenological description cannot suffice for assuming that 
hallucination is a kind of perception. Therefore, the conclusion about the 
nature of hallucinatory experience cannot affect the nature of 
perception. In addition, in the light of some empirical findings the 
conclusions about the nature hallucinatory experience seem to be 
formulated by means of categories (e.g., internal and external) that raise 
serious doubts concerning their relevancy for hallucinatory phenomena. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
HOW MUCH DO WE LEARN ABOUT HALLUCINATIONS FROM 
THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS? 
 
The idea that our sensory experience cannot serve as a ground for 
knowledge lingers on within philosophical thinking from its very 
beginning. Since even the ancient sceptics argued against the possibility 
of knowledge based on sense perception due to its potentially illusory or 
hallucinatory character, it seems reasonable to address the issue of 
hallucination itself.  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss upon the philosophical 
account of hallucination present in current debates. I will mainly work 
on the so-called ‘argument from hallucination’ which provides a 
prevalent objection both against the direct realism theory of perception, 
and externalist theories of content of experience. My primary intention 
will be to single out the ontological claims concerning hallucinatory 
experience that constitute the core of the argument from hallucination. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of philosophical theses concerning 
hallucination will be discussed both by means of philosophical analysis, 
and in the light of chosen empirical findings. 
 
KEYWORDS: hallucination, perception, argument from hallucination, 
phenomenology, thought-experiment. 
 
 
